The Ninth Circuit Enters the Class Certification Fray: \u3cem\u3eSali\u3c/em\u3e\u27s Rejection of Evidentiary Formalism and Its Implications by Bachetti, Jessica
Boston College Law Review
Volume 60
Issue 9 Electronic Supplement Article 20
4-17-2019
The Ninth Circuit Enters the Class Certification
Fray: Sali's Rejection of Evidentiary Formalism and
Its Implications
Jessica Bachetti
Boston College Law School, jessica.bachetti@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, Evidence Commons, and the Labor
and Employment Law Commons
This Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more
information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jessica Bachetti, The Ninth Circuit Enters the Class Certification Fray: Sali's Rejection of Evidentiary Formalism and Its Implications, 60
B.C.L. Rev. II.-292 (2019), https://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol60/iss9/20
 
 II.-292 
THE NINTH CIRCUIT ENTERS THE CLASS 
CERTIFICATION FRAY: SALI’S REJECTION 
OF EVIDENTIARY FORMALISM AND  
ITS IMPLICATIONS 
Abstract: In 2015, registered nurses brought a putative employment class ac-
tion against the hospital that employed them, alleging that the hospital under-
paid them by rounding their time in violation of California law. The United 
States District Court for the Central District of California denied class certifica-
tion because the evidence that the plaintiffs submitted to demonstrate the “typi-
cality requirement” for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23 was inadmissible. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
held that inadmissibility alone is not a proper basis for denying class certifica-
tion, adding to the circuit split over the issue of whether evidence submitted at 
class certification proceedings must be admissible under the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. This Comment analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s position in the circuit 
split and argues that, because of the nature of the evidentiary challenges in Sali 
v. Corona Regional Medical, the applicability of its holding remains unclear for 
cases where evidentiary objections go to the form rather than the substance of 
the evidence. 
INTRODUCTION 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 (“FRCP 23”) governs class action 
lawsuits and sets forth the prerequisites that plaintiffs must satisfy to obtain 
class certification and adjudicate their claims on a class-wide basis.1 Alt-
hough FRCP 23 clearly lays out the prerequisites that plaintiffs must establish 
to obtain class certification, it does not articulate the standard that courts 
should apply to the evidence that plaintiffs submit to demonstrate fulfillment 
of these requirements.2 The Supreme Court has held that courts must under-
take a “rigorous analysis” when determining whether FRCP 23’s prerequisites 
                                                                                                                           
1 FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see BEVERLY REID O’CONNELL & KAREN L. STEVENSON, FEDERAL 
CIVIL PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL ¶ 10:250 (National ed. 2019) (discussing class actions generally 
and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s (“FRCP 23”) role in governing federal class action pro-
ceedings). 
2 See Linda S. Mullenix, Putting Proponents to Their Proof: Evidentiary Rules at Class Certi-
fication, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 606, 614 (2014) (explaining that, unlike Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56 (“FRCP 56”) for summary judgment, FRCP 23 does not specify the evidentiary 
standards for evidence offered in support of or in opposition to class certification). 
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have been satisfied, but did not specify what a rigorous analysis entails.3 In 
light of FRCP 23’s omissions and the lack of guidance from the Court, circuit 
courts have reached varying conclusions about what evidentiary standards 
should be applied when evaluating whether to certify a class under FRCP 23.4 
At the heart of their divergence, the circuit courts are conflicted about 
whether evidence submitted in support of class certification must be admissi-
ble under the Federal Rules of Evidence.5 Because class certification under 
FRCP 23 is often outcome-determinative for the case, the evidentiary stand-
ards that the courts impose at the class certification stage have critical impli-
cations for the way that plaintiffs and defendants approach class actions.6 Ac-
cordingly, the current circuit split on this issue has far-reaching implications 
for class litigation.7 
The Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have all held 
that courts must only consider admissible evidence in deciding whether to 
certify a class, although the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that evi-
dence submitted in support of class certification need not be admissible.8 The 
                                                                                                                           
3 See Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351 (2011) (holding that courts must under-
take a “rigorous analysis” to determine whether plaintiffs have affirmatively demonstrated the 
FRCP 23’s requirements, but not elaborating on what the analysis involves). 
 4 See Libby Jelinek, The Applicability of the Federal Rules of Evidence at Class Certification, 
65 UCLA L. REV. 280, 286 (2018) (explaining how the federal courts are currently split on 
whether evidence at the class certification stage must be admissible); Mullenix, supra note 2, at 
634 (discussing that courts are currently divided on the evidentiary rules governing the materials 
submitted in support or in opposition to a motion for class certification given FRCP 23’s omis-
sions and the lack of explicit guidance in the class certification jurisprudence). 
5 See Jelinek, supra note 4, at 294 (explaining how the federal courts diverge on whether the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and thus Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. apply to evi-
dence submitted at class certification proceedings); Mullenix, supra note 2, at 614 (explaining that 
FRCP 23’s failure to clarify an array of critical matters has left courts without much guidance in 
making class certification determinations). 
6 See Charles Silver, “We’re Scared to Death”: Class Certification and Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 1357, 1399 (2003) (discussing the charge that defendants are blackmailed into settlement 
when the court certifies a class due to litigation costs and reputational risks of defending a class 
action); Amy Dudash, Casebrief, Hydrogen Peroxide: The Third Circuit Comes Clean About the 
Rule 23 Class Action Certification Standard, 55 VILL. L. REV. 985, 986–87 (2010) (explaining 
how the high risks and costs of defending class litigation usually compel defendants to settle if 
class certification is granted, although damages will generally not be enough to justify litigation 
on an individual basis for plaintiffs if class certification is denied). 
7 See Robert H. Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 729, 753 (2013) 
(explaining how higher evidentiary burdens under FRCP 23 make it more difficult for plaintiffs to 
bring class action lawsuits). 
8 Compare In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., 783 F.3d 183, 185 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding 
that challenged expert testimony must satisfy evidentiary standard set out in Daubert to satisfy the 
requirements of FRCP 23), and Messner v. Northshore Univ. Health Sys., 669 F.3d 802, 812 (7th 
Cir. 2012) (concluding that the district the court should make an explicit Daubert ruling on expert 
testimony that is critical to class certification), and Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 319 
(5th Cir. 2005) (holding that expert testimony submitted in support of class certification must be 
admissible under Daubert), with In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 612 
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Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ 2018 decision in Sali v. Corona Regional 
Medical Center (Sali II) contributed to this circuit split.9 In 2015, the plain-
tiffs brought a putative employment class action against the hospital that em-
ployed them.10 The United States District Court for the Central District of 
California, in 2015 in Sali v. Universal Health Services, Inc. (Sali I), denied 
class certification, finding that the plaintiffs failed to meet the typicality re-
quirement of FRCP 23 because the evidence they submitted to demonstrate 
typicality was inadmissible.11 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that inadmis-
sibility alone is an improper basis for denying class certification.12 
Part I of this Comment discusses Sali II’s specific factual background 
and procedural history, and provides both the procedural standard for class 
certification under FRCP 23 and the evolution the rule’s judicial interpreta-
tion.13 Part II of this Comment explains the different positions that circuit 
courts have taken regarding the evidentiary standards governing class certifi-
cation, and examines the contribution that the Ninth Circuit makes to the cir-
cuit split with its decision in Sali.14 Part III of this Comment analyzes the 
Ninth Circuit’s position in the circuit split and argues that Sali II’s implica-
tions remain unclear for cases where evidentiary objections based on Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. go to the form rather than the substance 
of the evidence.15 
I. HISTORY OF SALI V. CORONA REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, THE  
STANDARD FOR CLASS CERTIFICATION UNDER FRCP 23  
AND ITS JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 
Section A of this Part discusses Sali II’s factual background and proce-
dural history.16 Section B of this Part discusses the procedure for class certifi-
                                                                                                                           
(8th Cir. 2011) (holding that the district court is not limited to considering only admissible evi-
dence in evaluating whether FRCP 23’s requirements are met). 
9 See Sali v. Corona Reg’l Med. Ctr. (Sali II), 889 F.3d 623, 632 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that 
inadmissibility of evidence alone is not a proper basis for denying class certification), amended by 
909 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2018). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals amended its 2018 opinion in 
Sali v. Corona Regional Medical Center to correct several citations, but left the substance of the 
opinion unchanged. Compare, e.g., 889 F.3d at 637 (citing “Morillion, 22 Cal.4th 575, 94 
Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 P.2d at 141”), with 909 F.3d at 1010 (citing “Morillion, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 3, 995 
P.2d at 141”). 
10 Sali v. Universal Health Servs., Inc. (Sali I), No. CV 14-985 PSG (JPRx), 2015 WL 
12656937, at *1 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 2015), rev’d sub nom. Sali II, 889 F.3d 623. 
11 Id. 
12 Sali II, 889 F.3d at 632. 
13 See infra notes 16–56 and accompanying text. 
14 See infra notes 57–79 and accompanying text. 
15 See infra notes 59–79 and accompanying text. 
16 See infra notes 82–96 and accompanying text. 
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cation under FRCP 23.17 Section C of this Part discusses the judicial devel-
opment of the standards for class certification under FRCP 23 and the Su-
preme Court’s holding that courts must conduct a “rigorous analysis” to de-
termine whether plaintiffs have affirmatively demonstrated FRCP 23’s pre-
requisites.18 Section D of this Part discusses how FRCP 23’s omissions and 
the lack of explicit guidance from the Supreme Court has created a diver-
gence among circuit courts about what evidentiary standards should be ap-
plied when evaluating whether to certify a class.19 
A. Factual Background and Procedural History of Sali 
In 2015, plaintiffs Marilyn Sali and Deborah Spriggs brought a putative 
employment class action against Corona Regional Medical Center (“Coro-
na”), an acute care hospital in Southern California that formerly employed 
them as registered nurses (“RNs”).20 The plaintiffs filed the class action on 
behalf of a general class and seven subclasses of RNs, alleging that Corona’s 
practice of rounding the time at which RNs clocked in and out resulted in un-
derpayment of wages in violation of California law.21 In Sali I, the district 
court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for class certification of each proposed 
                                                                                                                           
17 See infra notes 20–39 and accompanying text. 
18 See infra notes 40–51 and accompanying text. 
 19 See infra notes 52–56 and accompanying text. 
 20 Sali I, 2015 WL 12656937, at *1. The plaintiffs asserted their claims against both Corona 
and Defendant UHS-Delaware, a healthcare management company that manages and provides 
administrative support to Corona, under a joint-employer liability theory. 
 21 Id.; See’s Candy Shops v. Super. Ct., 148 Cal. Rptr. 3d 690, 704–05 (Ct. App. 2012) (inter-
preting 29 C.F.R. § 785.48 and holding that, under California law, an employer’s use of a round-
ing policy is permissible if the policy is facially fair and neutral, and is used in such a manner that 
does not result in failure to adequately compensate employees for the time they have actually 
worked). Plaintiffs asserted multiple violations of California law, including failure to pay all regu-
lar hourly wages for all required work hours, failure to pay all overtime wages for requisite work 
hours, failure to pay correct overtime rate of pay, failure to pay premium wages for meal and rest 
periods, failure to pay all wages due upon termination of employment, failure to provide accurate 
itemized wage statements, and a violation of California’s Unfair Competition Law. Sali I, 2015 
WL 12656937, at *1. The general class was comprised of all full-time or full-time equivalent RNs 
formerly and currently employed by Defendants in California from the period of August 23, 2009, 
to the present who were underpaid wages for regular rate of pay, overtime hours, and off-duty and 
meal-and-rest periods. Id. at *2. The seven subclasses possess the aforementioned characteristics, 
as well as other attributes specific to the nature of their employment by the defendant. Id. at *3. 
Corona did not dispute its rounding-time practices. Id. Corona used a system called Kronos to 
track hours worked by its RNs and paid them an hourly wage based on the time they punched in 
and out, rounding to the nearest quarter hour. Id. at *1. For example, if an RN clocked in at 6:53 
a.m. or at 7:07 a.m., his or her time was rounded to 7:00 a.m. Id. at *4. Plaintiffs contended that 
Corona’s rounding policy, despite its facial fairness and neutrality, failed to sufficiently compen-
sate RNs overtime for all hours actually worked due to the fact that RNs lost more minutes than 
they gained as a result of the policy. Id. 
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class on four grounds.22 Among the four grounds for denial, the court con-
cluded that the named plaintiffs failed to meet the typicality prerequisite of 
FRCP 23.23 
To establish FRCP 23’s typicality requirement, the plaintiffs submitted 
the declaration of a paralegal at their counsel’s office to demonstrate their 
alleged injuries.24 In the declaration, the paralegal opined that, based on his 
analysis, Corona’s rounding policy undercounted Sali’s and Sprigg’s actual 
clocked times.25 The district court struck the declaration on the basis that it 
was inadmissible evidence and thus found that the plaintiffs failed to meet 
their burden of demonstrating, as required for class certification, that their 
proposed class satisfied FRCP 23’s typicality prerequisite.26 
The plaintiffs appealed the district court’s denial of class certification 
and, specifically, its finding that the typicality requirement was not met.27 On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in 
declining to consider the declaration submitted in support of class certifica-
tion solely on the grounds that it would be inadmissible at trial.28 
                                                                                                                           
22 Sali I, 2015 WL12656937, at *1. First, the United States District Court for the Central Dis-
trict of California found that several of the proposed classes were insufficient to establish FRCP 
23’s predominance requirement. Id. at *4–9. Second, the court held that plaintiffs failed to meet 
FRCP 23’s typicality prerequisite for any of the proposed classes. Id. at *10. Third, the district 
court concluded that Spriggs was not an adequate class representative because she was not a 
member of the proposed class she was attempting to represent. Id. at *11. Fourth, the district court 
held the attorneys from the law firm, Bisnar Chase, had not demonstrated they would adequately 
serve as class counsel. Id. at *12. 
23 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); Sali II, 889 F.3d at 627. The typicality requirement necessitates that 
“the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the 
class.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 
24 Sali II, 889 F.3d at 630. Plaintiffs submitted a declaration from a paralegal, Javier Ruiz, an-
alyzing the effect of Corona’s rounding time policy. Id. 
 25 Id. Ruiz compared plaintiffs’ actual times with the rounded times and found that the round-
ing policy undercounted the plaintiffs’ times by an average of eight minutes for Sali and six 
minutes for Spriggs per shift. Id. 
 26 Id. The district court found that Ruiz was unable to authenticate the Excel sheets and data 
he used to conduct his analysis because he lacked personal knowledge to attest to the fact that the 
data accurately represented plaintiffs’ employment records. Id. The court further concluded that 
Ruiz’s declaration constituted improper opinion testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 701 
(“FRE 701”) because his analysis required technical qualifications of an expert that lie outside 
FRE 701’s limitations for opinion testimony by lay witnesses. FED. R. EVID. 701; Sali II, 889 F.3d 
at 630. After determining that the declaration was categorically improper lay testimony, the court 
held that the declaration did not qualify as admissible expert testimony under Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702 because Ruiz lacked the technical and specialized qualifications to analyze the pay 
data. FED. R. EVID. 702; Sali II, 889 F.3d at 630. 
 27 Sali II, 889 F.3d at 629. The plaintiffs appealed all the of district court’s findings. Id. 
 28 Id. at 632. 
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B. Procedure for Class Certification: Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 
FRCP 23 governs class actions in federal court, serving as the mechanism 
by which a matter can be adjudicated on a class-wide basis.29 District courts 
must grant certification under FRCP 23 to plaintiffs seeking to adjudicate their 
claims through a class action before they may proceed with class litigation.30 
To obtain class certification, plaintiffs must affirmatively demonstrate four 
threshold requirements: (1) numerosity; (2) commonality; (3) typicality; and 
(4) adequacy of representation.31 Additionally, plaintiffs seeking class certifi-
cation must show that the class meets at least one of the three provisions for 
types of class actions set forth under FRCP 23.32 A motion for class certifica-
tion under FRCP 23 can be initiated at any time by the plaintiff, defendant, 
or—in the event that neither party moves for certification—the court.33 Failure 
                                                                                                                           
29 FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see O’CONNELL & STEVENSON, supra note 1, ¶ 10:250 (discussing 
class actions generally and FRCP 23’s role in governing federal class action proceedings). 
30 FED. R. CIV. P. 23; see 7 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE § 1785 (3d ed. 2001, Supp. Nov. 2018) (explaining that courts must make 
determinations of class certification under FRCP 23 for class actions to proceed). 
 31 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a) (establishing that “one or more members of a class may sue or be 
sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the class is so numerous that 
joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class; 
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the 
class; and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the 
class”); see also Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 349–50 (explaining that satisfaction of FRCP 23’s 
commonality element requires that claims invoke a common legal theory that is capable of class-
wide resolution); Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997) (asserting that the ade-
quacy requirement under FRCP 23 serves to ensure that there are no conflicts of interest between 
named parties and the class they seek to represent and affirming that representative plaintiffs must 
satisfy the numerosity requirement of FRCP 23 by demonstrating that a joinder would prove im-
practicable under the circumstances); Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., 687 F.3d 583, 591–92 (3rd Cir. 
2012) (asserting that plaintiffs must establish that claims arose from the same event or pattern or 
practice and are based on the same legal theory to satisfy FRCP 23’s typicality requirement); 
Jelinek, supra note 4, at 286 (explaining that plaintiffs moving for class certification have the 
burden of demonstrating that FRCP 23(a)’s prerequisites are met). 
 32 FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b); O’CONNELL & STEVENSON, supra note 1, ¶ 10:385. Plaintiffs must 
establish that their class satisfies one or more of the following categories to obtain class certifica-
tion: (1) prejudice class action, wherein there is a risk of prejudice from separate actions such that 
a class action suit is necessary; (2) injunctive or declaratory relief class action, wherein the actions 
or omissions on the part of the opposing party are applicable to the class generally, thus justifying 
injunctive or declaratory relief as the appropriate remedy with regards to the class as a whole; or 
(3) damages class action, wherein common questions of law and fact predominate over individual 
differences and, on the aggregate, class litigation is the superior method of adjudicating the 
claims. O’CONNELL & STEVENSON, supra note 1, ¶ 10:385. 
 33 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 30, § 1785 (explaining that either plaintiff or defendant 
may move for a class certification, and that, in the event neither party initiates a motion, the court 
is permitted to make its determination of whether to certify the class under FRCP 23 given its 
independent obligation to decide whether a claim can be brought on a class-wide basis). 
II.-298 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
to affirmatively demonstrate the mandatory requirements of Rules 23 will re-
sult in denial of class certification.34 
Class certification under FRCP 23 is a pivotal stage in class litigation.35 
Theoretically, class certification is a tentative and preliminary proceeding, as 
FRCP 23 establishes that an order granting or denying certification may be 
altered or amended prior to the final judgment.36 In reality, however, the deci-
sion to certify a class is often outcome-determinative.37 Given the high costs 
and exposure associated with defending class action litigation, an order grant-
ing class certification typically compels defendants to settle, whereas an order 
denying class certification is often the deathblow for plaintiffs who will be 
unlikely to recover enough individually to justify continued litigation.38 Ac-
cordingly, it is common for plaintiffs and defendants to offer evidence—
particularly in the form of expert testimony—to support or defeat the demon-
stration of FRCP 23’s requirements for class certification at this stage.39 
C. FRCP 23 in Operation—Judicial Development of the  
Standards for Class Certification 
Although the black letter language of FRCP 23 establishes the threshold 
requirements that plaintiffs must meet for class certification to be granted, the 
rule does not specify the standards governing evidence submitted in support 
of these prerequisites.40 Given FRCP 23’s omissions and the lack of explicit 
                                                                                                                           
34 See Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 345 (establishing that class certification is only proper if 
plaintiffs affirmatively demonstrate FRCP 23’s requirements). 
 35 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 30, § 1785 (asserting that class certification determina-
tions have a significant impact on the named parties, absent parties, and on the court); Dudash, 
supra note 6, at 987 (asserting that a decision to certify a class typically leads to settlement of the 
case, with eighty-nine percent of certified class actions resulting in settlement, whereas denial of a 
class certification motion eliminates the mechanism of class adjudication that made the lawsuit 
viable in the first place thereby signaling the end of litigation for plaintiffs). 
36 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(C) (establishing that an order granting or denying class certifi-
cation is subject to amendment or alteration); Zurn, 644 F.3d at 613 (reasoning that a court’s rul-
ing on a motion for class certification is “inherently tentative” and “preliminary” and may be 
reevaluated after the completion of discovery). 
 37 See Dudash, supra note 6, at 387 (explaining how class certification rulings generally dic-
tate the fate of the case). 
38 See Silver, supra note 6, at 1399 (discussing how certification increases the likelihood of 
settlement). 
39 See M. Joseph Winebrenner, Expert Evidence at Class Certification and the Role of Daubert, 
AM. BAR ASS’N (July 16, 2015), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/
masstorts/articles/summer2015-0715-expert-evidence-class-certification-stage-role-daubert.html 
[https://perma.cc/MY2X-X4K2] (explaining that parties will often invest in expert testimony to 
support or oppose class certification due to the significance of class certification of the outcome of 
the class action). 
40 See Mullenix, supra note 2, at 614 (explaining that, unlike FRCP 56 for summary judg-
ment, FRCP 23 does not specify the evidentiary standards for evidence offered in support of or in 
opposition to class certification). 
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guidance surrounding its application, class certification has proved to be 
somewhat of a gray area for courts.41 
In early class action jurisprudence, federal and state courts, guided by 
their favorable view of class litigation, generally engaged in lenient class cer-
tification proceedings.42 Courts applied FRCP 23 with an eye to the rule’s 
conception, which was to ensure that the primary functions of the class mech-
anism were being served; namely, that the class action suit was promoting 
judicial economy and fairly protecting the rights of parties who may other-
wise lack the means to litigate claims individually.43 Traditionally, this meant 
that courts did not conduct a searching analysis of a case’s merits at the class 
certification stage, but rather, generally granted class certification when the 
court determined it to be a fair and efficient means of litigating the claim at 
hand.44 The Supreme Court expressly stated in its 1974 decision in Eisen v. 
Carlisle & Jacquelin that neither the language nor history of FRCP 23 per-
mits courts to delve into the merits of a case when deciding whether to certify 
a class.45 
Nearly forty years later in 2011, however, the Supreme Court blurred the 
apparent clarity Eisen established in its ruling in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. 
Dukes, a seminal decision that marked the beginning of a shift in the previ-
ously lenient standards that had long characterized class action jurispru-
                                                                                                                           
41 See id. (explaining that FRCP 23’s failure to clarify an array of critical matters has left 
courts without much guidance in making class certification determinations); Jelinek, supra note 4, 
at 294 (explaining how the federal courts are currently split on whether all evidence at class certi-
fication be admissible). 
42 See Klonoff, supra note 7, at 752 (explaining that most courts only required minimal evi-
dentiary support for class certification proceedings); Mullinex, supra note 2, at 614 (explaining 
that many courts willingly certified class actions based on plaintiffs’ pleadings alone throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s, with most courts defaulting to a presumption favoring class litigation). 
  43 See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s note to 1966 amendment (explaining that the 
amendments to FRCP 23 took into account the rule’s purpose of assuring procedural fairness and 
protecting due process rights of litigants); David Marcus, The History of the Modern Class Action, 
Part I: Sturm Und Drang, 1953–1980, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 587, 594 (2013) (explaining that 
FRCP 23 promotes procedural goals by enabling individuals with similar claims against defend-
ants to litigate those claims together if doing so would obtain efficient and fair class-wide reme-
dy); Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution, 
107 NW. U. L. REV. 511, 531–37 (2013) (discussing the evolution of the court’s application and 
interpretation of the procedural rules governing class actions). 
44 See Klonoff, supra note 7, at 747 (detailing how plaintiffs were permitted to seek class cer-
tification based on the pleadings or on only minimal evidentiary support for most of class action 
jurisprudence); Linda S. Mullenix, Ending Class Actions As We Know Them: Rethinking the 
American Class Action, 64 EMORY L.J. 399, 421 (2014) (explaining the goals of class actions and 
the role class certification plays in effectuating them). 
45 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 158, 177 (1974) (asserting that there is no sup-
port found in FRCP 23’s language or history authorizing courts to “conduct a preliminary inquiry 
into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class action”).  
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dence.46 In Wal-Mart Stores, the Supreme Court laid the foundation for the 
modern class certification standard and established that courts must undertake 
a “rigorous analysis” in determining whether plaintiffs have affirmatively 
demonstrated FRCP 23’s prerequisites.47 Although the decision did not offer a 
precise guideline for what a “rigorous analysis” entails, it suggested that the 
standard for class certification under FRCP 23 is more exacting than the 
pleading standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8.48 The Court fortified 
this notion in its 2013 decision in Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, which departed 
from its position in Eisen.49 In Comcast, the Court held that a rigorous as-
sessment will often necessitate probing beyond the pleadings and into the 
underlying merits of the case at hand given that the legal and factual issues of 
a plaintiffs’ case have direct bearing on FRCP 23’s requirements.50 Although 
the Court’s decisions in Wal-Mart Stores and Comcast left district courts with 
much uncertainty regarding the application of the “rigorous analysis” stand-
ard in class certification determinations, they made one thing very clear: the 
bar for class certification had become significantly higher for plaintiffs seek-
ing to adjudicate their claims on a class-wide basis.51 
                                                                                                                           
46 See Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 351 (establishing that class certification requires courts to 
conduct a “rigorous analysis” to determine whether FRCP 23’s requirements have been met, 
which often entails some overlap with the underlying merits of the case); see also Mullinex, supra 
note 2, at 617 (explaining how Supreme Court declared that a heightened standard for judicial 
assessment of class certification must govern in Wal-Mart Stores). 
 47 Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 351. 
 48 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2) (a pleading that states a claim for relief must “contain a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”); Wal-Mart Stores, 
564 U.S. at 351 (asserting that FRCP 23 does not set forth a “mere pleading standard,” but rather, 
requires that a plaintiff affirmatively prove compliance with the rule’s prerequisites); Ashcroft v. 
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 686 (2009) (solidifying that the heightened standard for pleading set forth in 
Twombly applies to all civil actions); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546 (2007) (in-
terpreting Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 and establishing a heightened pleading standard, 
requiring that a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, if accepted as true, to “state a 
claim to relief that is plausible on its face”). 
49 Compare Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27, 33 (2013) (holding that a certification 
assessment often requires courts to probe into the merits of the case given that the factual and 
legal issues of the plaintiff’s cause of action are often inextricably embedded in determinations of 
whether a plaintiff has demonstrated the requirements of FRCP 23), with Eisen, 417 U.S. at 177 
(asserting that court is not permitted to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits of the case in 
ruling on a motion for class certification). 
50 Comcast, 569 U.S. at 33. 
51 See Joseph A. Seiner, The Issue Class, 56 B.C. L. REV. 121, 129 (2015) (discussing how 
scholars argue that the Court’s decision in Wal-Mart Stores undercuts plaintiffs’ ability to bring 
class actions); Mullinex, supra note 2, at 615 (explaining how federal courts followed the rigorous 
analysis standard set forth by the Supreme Court despite their various interpretations of it); Jelin-
ek, supra note 4, at 294 (asserting that Wal-Mart marked a departure from previous class certifica-
tion standards, resulting in a heightened evidentiary burden for plaintiffs at the class certification 
stage in the wake of this decision). 
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D. Application of the “Rigorous Analysis” Standard by the Circuit Courts: 
Admissibility Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, or  
Not Quite So Rigorous? 
Although federals courts have consistently cited the “rigorous analysis” 
standard in step with Supreme Court precedent, several circuit courts have 
invoked varying interpretations of what this standard means for evidence 
submitted in support of class certification.52 Most of the circuit courts’ diver-
gence in applying the rigorous analysis standard turns on the question of 
whether evidence submitted to demonstrate FRCP 23’s prerequisites at class 
certification proceedings must satisfy the admissibility requirements of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence.53 With expert testimony comprising a majority of 
the evidence submitted to establish FRCP 23’s prerequisites, much of the de-
bate around evidentiary sufficiency involves an even more nuanced question: 
whether expert testimony needs to meet the requirements of Federal Rule of 
Evidence 702 (“FRE 702”) and therefore the evidentiary standard set forth 
under Daubert.54 The Supreme Court has not explicitly answered this ques-
tion, but suggested in dicta in Wal-Mart Stores that expert evidence submitted 
in support of class certification must be admissible under Daubert.55 In light 
of this non-binding dicta, several circuit courts have reached differing conclu-
                                                                                                                           
52 See Jelinek, supra note 4, at 294 (explaining the disputed application of the rigorous analy-
sis standard for assessment of class certification under FRCP 23). 
 53 See id. at 295 (explaining that the dispute over the admissibility requirements arises be-
cause plaintiffs rely on expert evidence to produce social framework analysis and statistical evi-
dence central to class action claims). 
 54 FED. R. EVID. 702; see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (estab-
lishing a set of criteria for federal courts to determine the admissibility of expert testimony under 
FRE 702); Jelinek, supra note 4, at 289 (noting how issue of admissibility under FRE 702 is the 
central debate regarding evidentiary sufficiency required for class certification given prevalence of 
expert testimony). In interpreting FRE 702 in its 1993 opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Phar-
maceuticals, Inc., the Supreme Court set forth a new evidentiary standard governing the admissi-
bility of expert testimony in federal courts, which requires federal courts to determine whether an 
expert’s testimony is reliably based on scientifically valid methods and relevant to the facts of the 
case. 509 U.S. at 591. The Court provided a list of non-exhaustive factors that should guide a 
federal court’s assessment of the admissibility, including: (1) whether an expert’s opinion has 
been peer reviewed; (2) whether an expert’s theory can be and has been tested; (3) known or po-
tential error rate of an expert’s theory; and (4) general acceptance of an expert’s theory in the 
relevant scientific community in which it is based. Id. at 595–99. FRE 702 states that 
a witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa-
tion may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if: (a) the expert’s scientific, tech-
nical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to understand the evidence 
or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data; (c) the 
testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (d) the expert has reliably 
applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case. 
FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 55 See Wal-Mart Stores, 564 U.S. at 351 (asserting, in dicta, the Court’s doubt regarding the 
United States District Court for the Northern District of California’s conclusion that expert evi-
dence submitted in support of class certification need not be admissible under Daubert). 
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sions about the applicability of the Federal Rules of Evidence when deciding 
whether to certify a class.56 
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S CONTRIBUTION 
Section A of this Part discusses the circuit split about whether evidence 
submitted in support of class certification needs to be admissible.57 Section B 
of this Part discusses the contribution that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ 
2018 decision in Sali v. Corona Regional Medical Center (Sali II) makes to 
this circuit split.58 
A. The Circuit Split: Evidentiary Standards for Class Certification 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has directly held that evidence of-
fered in support of class certification must be admissible under Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.59 In 2005, in Unger v. Amedisys Inc., the 
Fifth Circuit reversed the United States District Court for the Middle District 
of Alabama’s decision to certify the class, finding that the plaintiffs failed to 
demonstrate FRCP 23’s predominance requirement because the expert testi-
mony offered to support plaintiffs’ fraud-on-the-market theory did not satisfy 
Daubert.60 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has reached a similar conclusion, 
holding that evidence submitted to establish the prerequisites of FRCP 23 is 
                                                                                                                           
 56 See Blood Reagents, 783 F.3d at 185 (holding that challenged expert testimony must satisfy 
evidentiary standard set out in Daubert to satisfy the requirements of FRCP 23); Messner, 669 
F.3d at 812 (concluding that the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois 
should make an explicit Daubert ruling on expert testimony that is critical to class certification); 
Zurn, 644 F.3d at 612 (holding that the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota 
was not limited to considering only admissible evidence in evaluating whether FRCP 23’s re-
quirements are met); Unger, 401 F.3d at 319 (holding that expert testimony submitted in support 
of class certification must be admissible under Daubert). 
 57 See infra notes 59–72 and accompanying text. 
 58 See infra notes 73–79 and accompanying text. 
 59 Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 325 (5th Cir. 2005). 
 60 Id. Purchasers of common stock in Amedisys Inc. filed a securities fraud action alleging 
that the company increased its stock price by overestimating costs for certain health services to 
inflate the company’s earnings. Id. at 319. To sufficiently satisfy FRCP 23’s predominance re-
quirement, the plaintiffs needed to demonstrate that the circumstances surrounding each class 
member’s alleged reliance on the fraudulent misrepresentation were the same. Id. at 322. The 
plaintiffs submitted evidence supporting a fraud-on-the-market theory to establish such consistent 
circumstances, which consisted of an Internet printout and affidavits from plaintiffs’ witnesses 
that were admitted without opportunity for cross-examination. Id. The United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Louisiana certified the class, finding that plaintiffs had sufficiently 
demonstrated the fraud-on-the-market theory needed to satisfy FRCP 23’s predominance require-
ment. Id. at 324. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated and remanded the district 
court’s decision, holding that class certification was improper because evidence submitted to es-
tablish predominance requirement was inadmissible. Id. at 325. 
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subject to the Daubert standard.61 In its decision in 2015, in In re Blood Rea-
gents Antitrust Litigation, the Third Circuit held that the district court erred in 
finding that FRCP 23’s predominance requirement had been satisfied by ex-
pert testimony the plaintiffs offered to prove class-wide antitrust impact over 
the defendants’ objections to its admissibility.62 The Third Circuit vacated the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s class 
certification order and instructed the district court to conduct a Daubert in-
quiry on remand if it determined that defendants’ evidentiary challenges are 
relevant to aspects of plaintiffs’ expert testimony offered to satisfy FRCP 
23.63 
Though not an explicit holding, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
has also suggested that expert evidence submitted in support of class certifica-
tion must satisfy the Daubert standard of admissibility.64 Unlike Unger and 
Blood Reagents, which focused on the standard applied to expert evidence 
submitted by plaintiffs in support of class certification, the central question in 
2012, in Messner v. Northshore University HealthSystem, was whether Daub-
ert applied to the defendant’s expert testimony submitted in opposition to 
class certification.65 The Seventh Circuit in Messner ultimately held that a 
                                                                                                                           
 61 In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., 783 F.3d 183, 187 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 62 Id. Direct purchasers of traditional blood reagents alleged that defendants, two pharmaceu-
tical companies, violated the Sherman Antitrust Act by conspiring to raise and horizontally fix 
prices. Id. at 185. To establish FRCP 23’s predominance requirement, plaintiffs submitted expert 
testimony to prove class-wide antitrust impact and damages. Id. at 186. Defendants challenged this 
expert testimony on the basis that it was unreliable under the Daubert standard. Id. Despite de-
fendants’ evidentiary challenges, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania concluded that the plaintiffs satisfied the predominance requirement and certified the 
class on the basis that the evidence could evolve to be admissible at trial. Id. at 187. On appeal, the 
Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the district court erred in certifying the class without 
conducting a Daubert inquiry to determine if plaintiffs’ challenged testimony in support of FRCP 
23’s predominance requirement was reliable, citing the Supreme Court’s dictum in Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes to support their conclusion. Id. 
 63 Id. at 187. 
 64 See Messner v. Northshore Univ. Health Sys., 669 F.3d 802, 812 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding 
that the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois erred by giving an expert 
report “the weight . . . it is due” rather than ruling on the report’s admissibility under the Daubert 
standard). In 2012, in Messner v. Northshore Univeristy Health Systems, the Seventh Circuit Court 
of Appeals identified as one of the central issues whether the defendant’s merger had an antitrust 
impact on the plaintiffs. Id. at 808. Thus, to fulfill the predominance requirement of FRCP 23, the 
plaintiffs were required to establish that the merger had a class-wide and consistent impact on 
them. Id. at 810. Northshore offered expert testimony that concluded that the plaintiffs’ proposed 
class included a number of members who the alleged price increase did not impact and that the 
plaintiffs had failed to present a methodology for identifying class members. Id. The plaintiffs 
moved to strike the defendant’s expert testimony prior to the district court’s hearing on class certi-
fication, arguing that the expert’s analyses were defective and inadmissible. Id. The district court 
refused to conduct a Daubert analysis in response to the plaintiffs’ challenge and proceeded to 
deny class certification. Id. 
  65 Compare id. at 812 (determining on appeal whether the district court erred in refusing to 
conduct a Daubert analysis in response to evidentiary challenges to the defendant’s expert’s quali-
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district court must make a conclusive Daubert ruling in response to eviden-
tiary challenges when the expert testimony is critical to class certification.66 
In reaching this conclusion, the court invoked the logic that expert testimony 
the defendant offers must be assessed under the same standard applied to the 
plaintiff’s expert testimony.67 Thus, by assuming the applicability of Daubert 
to plaintiffs’ expert evidence in arriving at its ultimate holding, the Seventh 
Circuit’s decision in Messner implicitly reinforced the notion that expert tes-
timony offered in support of class certification must be admissible under 
Daubert.68 
Diverging from the holdings of the other circuits and the dicta in Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held in 2011, 
in In re Zurn Pex Plumbing, that a district court is not required to make a full 
and definitive determination of admissibility under Daubert at the class certi-
fication stage.69 In its decision, the Eighth Circuit held that the United States 
District Court for the District of Minnesota acted within its discretion in find-
ing that the plaintiffs had satisfied FRCP 23’s predominance requirement 
without applying a conclusive Daubert analysis to expert testimony offered to 
                                                                                                                           
fications and testimony prior to ruling on a motion for class certification), with Blood Reagents, 
783 F.3d at 187 (deciding whether Daubert applies to plaintiffs’ expert evidence submitted in 
support of class certification), and Unger, 401 F.3d at 319 (determining whether expert testimony 
offered by plaintiff in support of class certification must be admissible under Daubert). 
 66 See Messner, 669 F.3d at 812. The court explained that expert testimony is critical when it 
is significant to resolving an issue that is central to a determination of class certification. Id. 
 67 Id. 
 68 See id. (clarifying that denials of class certification are not exempt from the requirements of 
Daubert and FRE 702 and holding that FRE 702 applies to defendants and plaintiffs alike). The 
Seventh Circuit affirmed that a district court must make a conclusive Daubert ruling on a chal-
lenge to expert testimony from either party before making a ruling on a class certification motion 
if such testimony is deemed critical to class certification. Id. 
 69 See Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 351 (2011) (asserting, in dicta, its doubt re-
garding district court’s conclusion that expert evidence submitted in support of class certification 
need not be admissible under Daubert); In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 
604, 612 (8th Cir. 2011) (holding the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota 
was not limited to considering only admissible evidence in evaluating whether FRCP 23’s re-
quirements are met). In In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Products Liability Litigation, homeowners al-
leged that the defendants, manufacturers of plumbing systems, used defective brass fittings in their 
systems. 644 F.3d at 609. To establish FRCP 23’s predominance requirement, plaintiffs offered 
expert testimony to prove that Zurn’s fittings were caused by inherent defects rather than unusual-
ly corrosive water or improper installations and to demonstrate the consistently high failure rate of 
Zurn PEX plumbing systems with brass fittings. Id. at 610. The defendants did not challenge the 
methodology or qualifications of the plaintiffs’ experts, but argued that the district court should 
conduct a full Daubert of the analysis before certifying the class. Id. The district court rejected 
defendants’ argument that a full and conclusive Daubert inquiry was required at the class certifi-
cation stage and instead conducted a focused Daubert inquiry which sought to answer the question 
of whether common evidence could suffice to show classwide injury if plaintiffs’ basic allegations 
were true. Id. The district court found that the plaintiffs’ expert testimony passed muster under this 
focused Daubert analysis and proceeded to certify the class. Id. at 613. 
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prove that the defendants’ product defect caused class-wide injury.70 The 
Eighth Circuit concluded that a rigorous analysis of expert testimony under 
FRCP 23 requires a limited assessment that resolves disputes surrounding 
expert testimony only to the extent necessary to determine whether evidence, 
if proven to be true, would be sufficient for plaintiffs to establish a prima fa-
cie case for the class.71 In rejecting Daubert’s applicability at the class certifi-
cation stage, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that an application of the “formal 
strictures” of trial to such an early phase of litigation is improper given that 
class certification orders, unlike summary judgment motions, are “inherently 
tentative” and usually made before the close of discovery.72 
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision in Sali: Deepening the Circuit Split 
The Sali II decision deepens the circuit split regarding the evidentiary 
sufficiency required for class certification.73 The Ninth Circuit’s holding in 
Sali II is consistent with the Eighth Circuit’s position that evidence need not 
be admissible at the class certification stage, and stands in apparent contrast 
with the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits’ holdings that evidence submitted 
at the class certification stage must be admissible under Daubert.74 
                                                                                                                           
70 Id. at 612. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that defendants’ evidentiary objections did not chal-
lenge the experts’ methodology or qualifications, and thus such evidence was sufficient to estab-
lish class-wide injury and make out a prima facie case for plaintiffs. Id. 
 71 Id. The Eighth Circuit, in its 2011 decision in Zurn, held that a full and conclusive Daubert 
analysis would have been both impractical and unfair given the current stage of the evidence, as 
the full merits of discovery were not yet completed. Id. The Eighth Circuit further reasoned that a 
conclusive Daubert analysis is categorically inappropriate at the class certification stage given that 
Daubert’s gatekeeping function in preventing unreliable evidence from swaying juries is not im-
plicated. Id. 
72 Id. In justifying the appropriate evidentiary standard for the class certification stage, the 
Eighth Circuit differentiated class certification stage from summary judgment, explaining that 
admissible evidence is required at summary judgment because summary judgment ends trial with-
out litigation. Id. at 613. 
 73 See Sali v. Corona Reg’l Med. Ctr. (Sali II), 889 F.3d 623, 632 (9th Cir. 2018) (concluding 
that inadmissibility alone is not a proper basis for declining to consider evidence in support of 
class certification), amended by 909 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2018); Blood Reagents, 783 F.3d at 183 
(holding that challenged expert testimony must satisfy evidentiary standard set out in Daubert to 
satisfy the requirements of FRCP 23); Messner, 669 F.3d at 812 (concluding that the district the 
court should make an explicit Daubert ruling on expert testimony that is critical to class certifica-
tion); Zurn, 644 F.3d at 612 (holding that the district court is not limited to considering only ad-
missible evidence in evaluating whether FRCP 23’s requirements are met); Unger, 401 F.3d at 
319 (holding that expert testimony submitted in support of class certification must be admissible 
under Daubert). 
 74 Compare Sali II, 889 F.3d at 632 (concluding that inadmissibility alone is not a proper 
basis for declining to consider evidence in support of class certification), and Zurn, 644 F.3d at 
612 (holding that the district court is not limited to considering only admissible evidence in evalu-
ating whether FRCP 23’s requirements are met), with Blood Reagents, 783 F.3d at 183 (holding 
that challenged expert testimony must satisfy evidentiary standard set out in Daubert to satisfy the 
requirements of FRCP 23), and Messner, 669 F.3d at 812 (concluding that the district the court 
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In Sali II, the Ninth Circuit found that the United States District Court 
for the Central District of California abused its discretion in striking the para-
legal’s declaration and finding that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate FRCP 
23’s typicality requirement.75 The court held that Daubert should still be ap-
plied to evidence submitted in support of FRCP 23’s requirements, but that 
inadmissibility alone is an improper basis for denying class certification.76 
The Ninth Circuit also held that the district court must at least consider 
whether the plaintiffs’ proof is, or will likely lead to, admissible evidence 
when deciding whether plaintiffs have met their burden under FRCP 23.77 In 
reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit espoused logic from the Eighth 
Circuit’s decision in Zurn, reasoning that it is inappropriate to apply the for-
mal rules of trial to such an early and preliminary stage in litigation.78 The 
Ninth Circuit further held that the plaintiffs only needed to supply evidence 
sufficient to form a reasonable judgment about each requirement of FRCP 23 
in order to justify class certification.79 
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S POSITION IN THE CIRCUIT SPLIT & SALI’S 
POTENTIALLY LIMITED APPLICATION 
Section A of this Part examines the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ posi-
tion in the circuit split and concludes that the its holding in 2018 in Sali v. 
Corona Regional Medical Center (Sali II) stands in direct conflict with the 
holdings of the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, but does 
not go as far as the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in doing so.80 Section B 
of this Part argues that Sali II may only be limited to cases where evidentiary 
objections go to the form rather than the substance of the evidence.81 
A. The Ninth Circuit’s Position in the Circuit Split 
On its face, the Ninth Circuit’s decision, in Sali II, seems to signal that 
the Ninth Circuit has aligned itself with the Eighth Circuit in the debate over 
the evidentiary standards that govern class certification proceedings, and in 
                                                                                                                           
should make an explicit Daubert ruling on expert testimony that is critical to class certification), 
and Unger, 401 F.3d at 319 (holding that expert testimony submitted in support of class certifica-
tion must be admissible under Daubert). 
 75 Sali II, 889 F.3d at 631. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. 
 78 See id. at 632 (finding the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in Zurn persuasive and endorsing its 
conclusion that different evidentiary standards should govern summary judgment and class certifi-
cation given the inherent differences in these procedural stages in litigation). 
 79 Id. at 631. 
 80 See infra notes 81–86 and accompanying text. 
 81 See infra notes 87–97 and accompanying text. 
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the most general sense, it has.81 The Ninth Circuit, like the Eighth Circuit, has 
made it easier for plaintiffs to succeed on a motion for class certification by 
holding that evidence submitted at that stage is not required to be admissi-
ble.82 To this effect, Sali II manifests the same plaintiff-friendly posture as the 
Eighth Circuit’s decision in 2011 in In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Products, even 
borrowing the Eighth Circuit’s logic in arriving at its conclusion that inadmis-
sibility alone is not a proper grounds for denying class certification.83 Alt-
hough the Ninth Circuit relied on the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning in reaching 
its decision in Sali II, it did not go as far as the Eighth Circuit had in permit-
ting a less stringent Daubert to be applied at the class certification stage.84 
Unlike the Eighth Circuit in Zurn, where the court held that only a lim-
ited Daubert analysis should be applied to evidence submitted in support of 
class certification, the Ninth Circuit held that a full Daubert analysis applies 
but inadmissibility under Daubert should be not dispositive.85 This position 
stands in contrast to the Third, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits, where successful 
Daubert-based evidentiary challenges are sufficient for defendants to defeat a 
motion for class certification, yet does not go as far as the Eighth Circuit in 
permitting a lenient Daubert standard.86 
                                                                                                                           
 81 See Sali v. Corona Reg’l Med. Ctr. (Sali II), 889 F.3d 623, 632 (9th Cir. 2018) (holding that 
admissibility is not required for evidence submitted in support of class certification), amended by 
909 F.3d 996 (9th Cir. 2018); In re Zurn Pex Plumbing Prods. Liab. Litig., 644 F.3d 604, 613 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (concluding that a full and definitive determination of admissibility under Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. is not required at the class certification stage). 
 82 See Sali II, 889 F.3d at 632 (reasoning that requiring evidence to be admissible at the class 
certification stage risks ending class action suits before plaintiffs have the opportunity to obtain all 
crucial evidence from defendants given that class certification decisions often take place before 
the close of discovery); Zurn, 644 F.3d at 613 (reasoning that it would be unfair to require plain-
tiffs to submit admissible evidence in support of class certification because discovery is often not 
completed before class certification decisions are made); DAMIAN D. CAPOZZOLA, EXPERT WIT-
NESSES IN CIVIL TRIALS, EFFECTIVE PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION § 2:45 (2018–2019 ed.) 
(explaining how requiring expert testimony to satisfy Daubert increases the court's level of scruti-
ny at an earlier stage of class action litigation and therefore heightens standards for plaintiffs try-
ing to obtain certification). 
 83 See Sali II, 889 F.3d at 633 (agreeing with the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals that requir-
ing admissible evidence at the class certification stage is unfair given that class certification deci-
sions are usually made before discovery has been completed). 
 84 Compare id. at 632 (holding that inadmissibility of evidence under Daubert does not merit 
conclusion that the plaintiffs have failed to meet the requirements of FRCP 23), with Zurn, 644 
F.3d at 613 (asserting that Daubert should be applied less stringently at class certifications stage). 
 85 Compare Sali II, 889 F.3d at 633 (holding that district court should consider admissibility 
under Daubert when evaluating contested expert evidence, but that admissibility alone is not dis-
positive at class certification stage), with Zurn, 644 F.3d at 612 (holding that districts courts 
should apply a focused Daubert analysis in assessing challenged expert evidence submitted in 
support of class certification). 
 86 Compare Sali II, 889 F.3d at 633 (holding that district court should consider admissibility 
under Daubert when evaluating contested expert evidence, but that admissibility alone is not dis-
positive at class certification stage), with In re Blood Reagents Antitrust Litig., 783 F.3d 183, 187 
(3d Cir. 2015) (holding that challenged expert testimony must satisfy evidentiary standard set out 
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B. Sali II’s Rejection of Evidentiary Formalism and Its Implications  
Given the specific nature of the evidentiary objections raised in Sali II, 
the Ninth Circuit’s holding might be limited to cases where evidentiary chal-
lenges go strictly to the form rather than the substance of the evidence.87 In 
reaching its conclusion that inadmissibility of evidence offered in support of 
FRCP 23 is not dispositive, the Ninth Circuit upheld Daubert’s applicability 
to class certification proceedings but rejected evidentiary formalism.88 In Sali 
v. Universal Health Services, Inc. (Sali I), the district court rejected the para-
legal’s declaration summarizing and testifying on the time records because 
the paralegal did not have personal knowledge of the pay data he used in his 
analysis and did not reveal his methodology.89 The defendants did not chal-
lenge the validity of the data or the paralegal’s methodology, but instead, ob-
jected to the evidence on the grounds that it failed to meet the formal admis-
sibility requirements under FRE 702 and Daubert.90 The plaintiffs offered 
sworn declarations to authenticate the data and fill in the evidentiary gaps, but 
the district court refused to accept the declarations and therefore ruled that 
plaintiffs had failed to meet their evidentiary burden of demonstrating that 
their claims were typical of the proposed class.91 The Ninth Circuit asserted 
                                                                                                                           
in Daubert to satisfy the requirements of FRCP 23), and Messner v. Northshore Univ. Health Sys., 
669 F.3d 802, 812 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding that expert evidence submitted in support of class 
certification must meet the Daubert standard of admissibility), and Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 
F.3d 316, 319 (5th Cir. 2005) (concluding that evidence submitted in support of class certification 
must be admissible), and Zurn, 644 F.3d at 612 (holding that the United States District Court for 
the District of Minnesota was not limited to considering only admissible evidence in evaluating 
whether FRCP 23’s requirements are met). 
 87 See Sali II, 889 F.3d at 633 (holding that the defendants’ evidentiary challenges did not 
contest the validity of the evidence and thus were formalistic in nature). 
 88 FED. R. EVID. 701, 702; see Sali II, 889 F.3d at 633 (holding that the United States District 
Court for the Central District of California relied on “evidentiary formalism” in refusing to con-
sider the sworn declarations that Sali and Spriggs submitted to attest to the accuracy of the payroll 
data and vouch for its accuracy). The paralegal’s sworn declaration opining about the effects of 
Corona’s rounding policy did not constitute lay opinion under FRE 701 because it was based on 
“technical or other specialized knowledge within the scope of [FRE] 702.” FED. R. EVID. 701. 
Yet, because the paralegal did not qualify as an expert and did not reveal the methodology he used 
to make his computations, his opinion did not satisfy the admissibility standards under FRE 702 
and Daubert. FED. R. EVID. 702; Sali II, 889 F.3d at 633; see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 
U.S. 579, 592–93 (1993) (detailing the seminal test for admissibility of expert scientific testimo-
ny). Because the validity and accuracy of the computations themselves were not contested, the 
court believed that this evidence likely could have been presented by a qualified expert at trial in 
compliance with the standards of FRE 702. FED. R. EVID. 702; Sali II, 889 F.3d at 633.  
 89 See Sali II, 889 F.3d at 633 (explaining that the district court found that Ruiz’s declaration 
and spreadsheet were inadmissible because Ruiz did not explain his methods for data extraction 
and lacked personal knowledge of the payroll data’s accuracy). 
 90 See id. (explaining that neither the authenticity of the data nor the accuracy of Ruiz’s calcu-
lations were disputed).  
 91 See id. (discussing how the district court refused to consider the sworn declarations that 
Sali and Spriggs submitted to attest to the accuracy of the payroll data and vouch for its accuracy). 
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that striking the declaration on inadmissibility alone was inappropriate, rea-
soning that the evidence likely could have been presented in an admissible 
form at trial.92 In effect, because the validity of the evidence was not contest-
ed and the plaintiffs likely could have cured its deficiencies at trial, the Ninth 
Circuit seemingly wanted to avoid delivering a deathblow to plaintiffs’ ability 
to bring class action lawsuits on such formalistic grounds with a bright-line 
categorical holding that admissibility is dispositive at the class certification 
stage.93  
After Sali II, it is still unclear how the Ninth Circuit would handle 
Daubert-based objections that challenge the validity or methodology of the 
evidence.94 In reaching its conclusion in Sali II, the Ninth Circuit reasoned 
that formalistic objections to admissibility are not probative of whether the 
requirement of typicality was established and thus should not be dispositive.95 
Under this logic, however, Daubert objections that succeed in challenging the 
substance of the evidence submitted in support of class certification may still 
be appropriately dispositive in the Ninth Circuit, as fundamentally invalid or 
unreliable evidence would clearly constitute a failure to affirmatively demon-
strate a particular substantive requirement of FRCP 23.96 Thus, although Sali 
                                                                                                                           
 92 FED. R. EVID. 702; see Sali II, 889 F.3d at 633 (asserting that the district court’s decision to 
strike the evidence due to its formalistic deficiencies approach did not answer the question of 
whether the evidence satisfies the typicality requirement). Because there was no dispute about the 
validity of the data, the evidentiary deficiencies could likely be resolved by plaintiffs hiring an 
expert to opine on the effects of Corona’s rounding time policy and the methodology used rather 
than a paralegal. FED. R. EVID. 702; Sali II, 889 F.3d at 633. 
 93 See Sali II, 889 F.3d at 633 (asserting that the district court “relied on formalistic eviden-
tiary objections” and “unnecessarily excluded proof that tended to support class certification”); 
JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS § 3:12 (15th ed. 2018) (asserting 
that “an inflexible exclusion of all inadmissible evidence might lead to absurd results by barring 
consideration of, for example, pleadings, where a matter is undisputed”); Frederick Schauer, For-
malism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 510 (1988) (explaining the descriptive concept of formalism as deci-
sion-making according to a rule, often involving filtering out factors that a sensitive decision-
maker would otherwise consider in the decision-making process); Mullinex, supra note 2, at 256 
(discussing how a higher evidentiary bar for class certification front-loads the burden on plaintiffs 
in class litigation and makes certification more difficult to obtain). Because the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals believed that the plaintiffs could offer the evidence in an admissible form at 
trial, denying class certification on the basis of the black letter standards of FRE 702 alone would 
have been formalistic. Sali II, 889 F.3d at 633. 
 94 See Sali II, 889 F.3d at 634 (finding it significant that evidentiary objections did not contest 
validity or reliability of evidence). 
 95 See id. (asserting that the district court’s “narrow” and formalistic approach to evaluating 
the evidence was not probative of whether the plaintiffs demonstrated that their injuries were typi-
cal of the proposed class and arose out of the same court of conduct). 
 96 See Sali II, 889 F.3d at 632; Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 592 (3rd Cir. 
2012) (holding that demonstration of FRCP 23’s typicality prerequisite requires plaintiffs to estab-
lish that claims arose from the same event, pattern or practice). For example, flawed conclusions 
as a result of incorrect calculations about the effect of Corona’s rounding time on plaintiffs’ com-
pensation would constitute a substantive failure to demonstrate that the underpayment of wages to 
the proposed class of RNs arose out of Corona’s rounding time policy. Sali II, 889 F.3d at 632. 
II.-310 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 60:E. Supp. 
II clearly establishes that disposing of evidence submitted in support of class 
certification on formalistic grounds alone is too rigorous in the Ninth Circuit, 
it remains to be seen whether a sufficiently rigorous analysis requires admis-
sibility under Daubert when the substance of the evidence is challenged.97 
CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sali II conflicts with the Third, Fifth, and 
Seventh Circuits, where successful Daubert-based evidentiary challenges are 
sufficient for defendants to defeat a motion for class certification, yet does not 
go as far as the Eighth Circuit in permitting a less stringent Daubert standard 
to be applied to evidence submitted in support of class certification. The par-
ticular nature of the evidentiary objections at issue in Sali II may also limit 
the decision’s applicability. Although formalistic objections to admissibility 
will not be enough to defeat class certification after Sali II, it is unclear how 
the Ninth Circuit will rule when evidentiary challenges go substance rather 
than the form of the evidence. 
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